In this paper we introduce a general class of stream and block ciphers that are defined by means of systems of (ordinary) explicit difference equations over a finite field. We call this class "difference ciphers". Many important ciphers such as systems of LFSRs, Trivium/Bivium and KeeLoq are difference ciphers. To the purpose of studying their underlying explicit difference systems, we introduce key notions as state transition endomorphisms and show conditions for their invertibility. Reducible and periodic systems are also considered. We then propose general algebraic attacks to difference ciphers which are experimented by means of Bivium and KeeLoq.
Introduction
Stream and block ciphers are generally defined by recursive rules determining the evolution of a vector, which is called the state or register of the cipher, with entries in a finite field. The evolution runs along a discrete time corresponding to computer clocks and the key of the cipher is usually contained in the initial state.
In many important ciphers like Trivium and KeeLoq [3, 6] , such recursion is defined by a state transition function which is the one corresponding to a system of (ordinary) explicit difference equations. Such systems are fundamental notion, for instance, in the theory of discrete dynamical system (see, among others, [8] ) where the state vectors have usually real or complex coordinates.
If the difference equations are algebraic ones, which is always the case over a finite field, the theory of difference algebras (see [4, 20, 27] ) provides important insights about the structure and the solutions of a system of them. In particular, by mimicking the theory of commutative algebras, one has the notion of difference ideal and corresponding difference variety. Note that a system of explicit difference equations is easier to study than the implicit case because the state transition function provides a straightforward existence and uniqueness theorem for solutions (see Theorem 2.3) .
The simplest application of these ideas to ciphers (or pseudorandom number generators) are systems of Linear Feedback Shift Registers (briefly LFSRs). In this case, all difference equations defining the evolution of the cipher state are linear ones and the keystream (or pseudorandom binary sequence) is obtained by means of a combining (or filtering) function which is usually a non-linear polynomial. Note that the complete cipher can be treated as a special system of explicit difference equations where all equations except that one are linear. Another similar stream cipher is Trivium where one has three quadratic difference equations and a linear combining polynomial. If the state transition function is invertible, one has a possible flaw for the corresponding stream cipher. In fact, by using the inverse of the difference system governing the state, some opponent may recover the initial state containing the key by attacking any internal state. This technique has been used, for instance, to attack Trivium cipher and its simplified version Bivium (see [12, 14] and Section 5 and 6).
On the other hand, if an invertible difference system contains a subsystem that can be used to evolve separately a key which is a part of the initial state of the complete system, then this flaw becomes a resource for defining a block cipher. In this case, in fact, the plaintext is defined as the complement of the key in the initial state and the corresponding ciphertext is contained in a final state. The inverse system provides hence decryption. These ideas appear, for instance, in the definition of the block cipher KeeLoq. As it happens with KeeLoq, note that a possible weackness of such a cipher may arise from having a small period for the key subsystem (see [5, 15] and Section 5 and 7).
The present paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce basic notions and results about system of (algebraic ordinary) explicit difference equations over any base field. In particular, we introduce state transition endomorphisms and difference Gröbner bases, relating such notions by means of Theorem 2.12. In Section 3, we provide a Gröbner basis method to check for invertibility of a difference system and compute its inverse system. We also introduce the concept of reducible system. Periodic systems are defined in Section 4 where we recall the method to maximize the period of a system of LFSRs over the prime field GF(p).
In Section 5, we introduce the notion of difference stream and block ciphers as ciphers that are defined by explicit difference systems over a finite field. We then discuss general methods to perform algebraic attacks on such ciphers. These attacks are experimented in details in Section 6 and 7 for Bivium and KeeLoq. Finally, in Section 8 we conclude and propose some suggestions for further developments of the theory of difference ciphers.
Explicit difference system
Let K be any field and fix an integer n > 0. Consider a set of variables X(t) = {x 1 (t), . . . , x n (t)}, for any t ∈ N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Put X = t≥0 X(t) and denote by R = K[X] the polynomial algebra in the infinite set of variables X. Moreover, consider the injective algebra endomorphism σ : R → R such that x i (t) → x i (t + 1) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and t ≥ 0. We call σ the shift map of R. The algebra R, endowed with the map σ, is called the algebra of (ordinary) difference polynomials. If we consider the subalgebra R(t) = K[X(t)] ⊂ R, it is clear that σ defines by restriction an algebra isomorphism R(t) → R(t + 1). We also need the following notations. For any integers r 1 , . . . , r n ≥ 0 and t ≥ 0, we define the subset X(t) r1,...,rn = {x 1 (t), . . . , x 1 (t + r 1 − 1), . . . , x n (t), . . . , x n (t + r n − 1)} ⊂ X and the subalgebra R(t) r1,...,rn = K[X(t) r1,...,rn ] ⊂ R. The shift map σ also defines an isomorphism R(t) r1,...,rn → R(t + 1) r1,...,rn and we put X r1,...,rn = X(0) r1,...,rn , R r1,...,rn = R(0) r1,...,rn . Definition 2.1. Let r 1 , . . . , r n ≥ 0 be integers and consider some polynomials f 1 , . . . , f n ∈ R r1,...,rn . A system of (algebraic ordinary) explicit difference equations is by definition an infinite system of polynomial equations of the kind
. . .
x n (r n + t) = σ t (f n ).
(t ≥ 0)
Such a system is denoted briefly as
x n (r n ) = f n .
A K-solution of the system (1) is clearly an n-tuple of functions (a 1 , . . . , a n ) where a i : N → K (1 ≤ i ≤ n). For any t ≥ 0, the element a i (t) ∈ K is called the value of the function a i at the clock t.
Definition 2.2. Consider an explicit difference system (1) . For any t ≥ 0, we define the algebra endomorphism T(t) : R(t) r1,...,rn → R(t) r1,...,rn such that, for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n
By abuse of notation, we have that σT(t) = T(t + 1)σ and we put T = T(0). If r = r 1 + . . . + r n , we denote byT : K r → K r the polynomial map corresponding to T. For any polynomial f ∈ R r1,...,rn and for each vector v ∈ K r , one has that
If (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is a K-solution of (1) and t ≥ 0, we call the vector v(t) = (a 1 (t), . . . , a 1 (t + r 1 − 1), . . . , a n (t), . . . , a n (t + r n − 1)) ∈ K r the state of (a 1 , . . . , a n ) at the clock t. In particular, v(0) is the initial state of (a 1 , . . . , a n ). Then, the functionT maps the t-state v(t) into the (t + 1)-state v(t + 1), for all clocks t ≥ 0. We call T the state transition endomorphism andT the state transition map of the explicit difference system (1).
We have the following existence and uniqueness theorem for the solutions of an explicit system. Theorem 2.3. Denote by V K the set of all K-solutions of the explicit difference system (1). We have a bijective map ι : V K → K r such that (a 1 , . . . , a n ) → (a 1 (0), . . . , a 1 (r 1 − 1), . . . , a n (0), . . . , a n (r n − 1)).
In other words, the system (1) has a unique K-solution once fixed its initial state. Moreover, the maps ι, ι −1 are both polynomial ones.
Proof. Consider the state transition mapT : K r → K r of (1) which is a polynomial map. Observe that all powersT t : K r → K r (t ≥ 0) are also polynomial maps. If v(t) = (a 1 (t), . . . , a 1 (t + r 1 − 1), . . . , a n (t), . . . , a n (t + r n − 1)) denotes the t-state of a K-solution (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ V K , the inverse map ι −1 : v(0) → (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is obtained in the following way. The value a 1 (t) is the first coordinate of the vector v(t) =T t (v(0)), a 2 (t) is its (r 1 + 1)-th coordinate and so on. Since projections and T t are polynomial maps, we conclude that ι −1 is also such a map.
Consider the state transition endomorphism T : R r1,...,rn → R r1,...,rn of the system (1) . Note that all powers T t : R r1,...,rn → R r1,...,rn (t ≥ 0) are also endomorphisms whose corresponding polynomial maps are the functionsT t : K r → K r . For all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and t ≥ 0, we define the polynomial
By the argument of Theorem 2.3 and the identity (2), it follows that a i (t) = f i,t (v(0)), for all K-solutions (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ V K .
We introduce now the notion of difference Gröbner basis which provides very often an alternative way to compute the polynomial f i,t .
Consider an explicit difference system (1) and define the subset
If I = G σ , we have that (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is a K-solution of the system (1) if and only if this is a simultaneous K-solution of all polynomials f ∈ I. Then, we also say that (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is a K-solution of the difference ideal I and we put V K (I) = V K . For defining Gröbner bases, one needs to introduce monomial orderings on R.
Definition 2.5. Let ≺ be a total ordering on the set M = Mon(R) of all monomials of R. We call ≺ a monomial ordering of R if the following properties hold:
(i) ≺ is a multiplicatively compatible ordering, that is, if m ′ ≺ m ′′ then mm ′ ≺ mm ′′ , for all m, m ′ , m ′′ ∈ M ; (ii) ≺ is a well-ordering, that is, every non-empty subset of M has a minimal element. In this case, it follows immediately that (iii) 1 ≺ m, for all m ∈ M, m = 1.
Even though the variables set X is infinite, by Higman's Lemma [13] the polynomial algebra R = K[X] can be always endowed with a monomial ordering. For the following version of this key result, see for instance [1] Corollary 2.3 and remarks at the beginning of page 5175. Proposition 2.6. Let ≺ be a total ordering on M which verifies the properties (i), (iii) of Definition 2.5. If the restriction of ≺ to the variables set X ⊂ M is a well-ordering then ≺ is also a well-ordering on M , that is, it is a monomial ordering of R.
To introduce difference Gröbner bases, we need monomial orderings that are compatible with the shift map. Note that if ≺ is a difference monomial ordering, we have immediately that m ≺ σ(m), for all m ∈ M, m = 1. An important class of difference monomial orderings can be defined in the following way. Recall that all polynomial algebras R(t) = K[X(t)] (t ≥ 0) are in fact isomorphic by means of the shift map. Then, let us consider a same monomial ordering for all such algebras. Since R = t≥0 R(t), we can define on R the product monomial ordering such that X(0) ≺ X(1) ≺ . . .. For any choice of a monomial ordering on R(0), this is clearly a difference monomial ordering of R that we call clock-based.
From now on, we assume that R is endowed with a difference monomial ordering.
, for all i. One proves (see for instance [10] ) that for any f ∈ R there is a unique normal polynomial NF I (f ) ∈ R such that f − NF I (f ) ∈ I. We call NF I (f ) the normal form of f modulo I.
Then lm(Σ(G)) = Σ(lm(G)). In particular, if I is a difference ideal of R then LM(I) is also a difference ideal.
Proof. Since R is endowed with a difference monomial ordering, one has that lm(σ(f )) = σ(lm(f )), for any f ∈ R, f = 0. Then, Σ(lm(I)) = lm(Σ(I)) ⊂ lm(I) and therefore LM(I) = lm(I) is a difference ideal. Definition 2.9. Let I ⊂ R be a difference ideal and G ⊂ I. We call G a difference Gröbner basis of I if lm(G) is a difference basis of LM(I). In other words, lm(Σ(G)) = Σ(lm(G)) is a basis of LM(I), that is, Σ(G) is a Gröbner basis of I as an ideal of R.
For an optimized version of the Buchberger procedure for difference Gröbner bases, we refer to [9, 19] . Proposition 2.10. Consider an explicit difference system (1) and assume that R is endowed with a difference monomial ordering such that
Proof. From the assumption on the monomial ordering it follows that x i (r i ) = lm(x i (r i ) − f i ), for any i. By the linearity of such distinct leading monomials, we conclude that G is a difference Gröbner basis.
From now on, we assume that x i (r i ) ≻ lm(f i ), for any i. If I ⊂ R is the difference ideal generated by the set G = {x 1 (r 1 ) − f 1 , . . . , x n (r n ) − f n }, the above result implies that LM(I) = x 1 (r 1 ), . . . , x n (r n ) σ ⊂ R. In other words, the set of normal polynomials modulo I is exactly the subalgebra R r1,...,rn = K[X r1,...,rn ] where by definition X r1,...,rn = {x 1 (0), . . . , x 1 (r 1 − 1), . . . , x n (0), . . . , x n (r n − 1)}.
Proposition 2.11. The map η : R → R r1,...,rn , f → NF I (f ) is an algebra homomorphism. In other words, one has the algebra isomorphism η ′ : R/I → R r1,...,rn such that f + I → NF I (f ).
Proof. By definition, we have that η is a surjective K-linear map and Ker η = I. Then, it is sufficient to show that mm ′ / ∈ LM(I), for all monomials m, m ′ / ∈ LM(I). This holds because LM(I) is an ideal which is generated by variables.
Theorem 2.12. Let T : R r1,...,rn → R r1,...,rn be the state transition endomorphism of the system (1) and consider the algebra endomorphism σ ′ : R/I → R/I such that f + I → σ(f ) + I. Then, one has that Tη ′ = η ′ σ ′ . In particular, for each polynomial f ∈ R r1,...,rn and for all t ≥ 0, we have that T t (f ) = NF I (σ t (f )).
Proof.
Consider a polynomial f ∈ R r1,...,rn , that is, f = NF I (f ). The polynomial T(f ) ∈ R r1,...,rn is obtained from the polynomial σ(f ) ∈ R simply by applying the identities
Observe finally that the above result implies that f i,t = T t (x i (0)) = NF I (x i (t)).
Invertible systems
An important class of explicit difference systems are the ones such that a t-state can be obtained from a t ′ -state also for t ′ ≥ t.
Definition 3.1. For an explicit difference system (1), consider the state transition endomorphism T : R r1,...,rn → R r1,...,rn and the corresponding state transition mapT : K r → K r (r = r 1 + . . . + r n ). We call the system invertible if T is an automorphism. In this case,T is also a bijective map.
We recall now an effective invertibility criterion for endomorphisms of polynomial algebras. For a complete reference see [26] . Recall that a Gröbner basis G = {g 1 , . . . , g r } is called (completely) reduced if the polynomial g i is normal modulo the ideal generated by G \ {g i }, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r.
. , x ′ r } be two disjoint variable sets and define the polynomial algebras P = K[X], P ′ = K[X ′ ] and Q = K[X ∪X ′ ] = P ⊗P ′ . Consider an algebra endomorphism ϕ : P → P such that x 1 → g 1 , . . . , x r → g r (g i ∈ P ) and the corresponding ideal J ⊂ Q which is generated by the set
Moreover, we endow the polynomial algebra Q by a product monomial ordering such that X ≻ X ′ . Then, the map ϕ is an automorphism of P if and only if the reduced Gröbner basis of J is of the kind
..,rn be the state transition automorphism corresponding to an invertible system (1), namely (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
. , x ′ n (r n − 1)} and put Q r1,...,rn = R r1,...,rn ⊗ R ′ r1,...,rn . Consider the ideal J ⊂ Q r1,...,rn that is generated by the following polynomials, for any i = 1, 2, . . . n
With respect to a product monomial ordering of the algebra Q r1,...,rn such that X r1,...,rn ≻ X ′ r1,...,rn , the reduced Gröbner basis of J has the following form
..,rn , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Proof. By applying Theorem 3.2, it is sufficient to observe that the set
is the reduced Gröbner basis for the ideal of Q r1,...,rn that is generated by it.
By the above result, we obtain a sufficient condition to invertibility which is immediate to verify. Corollary 3.4. Consider an explicit difference system (1) and assume that
. , x n (0)} and the polynomial g i has all variables in the set X r1,...,rn \ X(0), for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, the system (1) is invertible.
Proof. With the same notations and assumptions of Proposition 3.3, consider the set
Since the variables of g i are in X r1,...,rn \ X(0), the normal form g ′ i modulo the ideal generated by G is clearly a polynomial with variables in the set
. , x ′ n (r n − 1)}. Then, the reduced Gröbner basis of the ideal J ⊂ Q r1,...,rn is given by the following polynomials, for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n
Definition 3.5. For an explicit difference system (1), consider the ideal J ⊂ Q r1,...,rn = R r1,...,rn ⊗ R ′ r1,...,rn which is generated by the following polynomials, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n
From now on, we assume that Q r1,...,rn is endowed with a product monomial ordering such that X r1,...,rn ≻ X ′ r1,...,rn . Definition 3.6. Consider an invertible system (1) and the corresponding state transition ideal J ⊂ Q r1,...,rn . If the set
is the reduced Gröbner basis of J, we denote by g i the image of f ′ i under the algebra isomorphism R ′ r1,...,rn → R r1,...,rn such that, for any i = 1, 2, . . . , n
The inverse of an invertible system (1) is by definition the following explicit difference system
. .
x n (r n ) = g n .
Let T, S : R r1,...,rn → R r1,...,rn be the state transition endomorphisms of an invertible system (1) and its inverse system (3), respectively. Denote by ξ : R r1,...,rn → R r1,...,rn the algebra automorphism such that
By Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.3, we have clearly that ξS = T −1 ξ. Proposition 3.7. Let (3) be the inverse system of an invertible system (1). If (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is a K-solution of (1), consider its t-state (t ≥ 0) v = (a 1 (t), . . . , a 1 (t + r 1 − 1), . . . , a n (t), . . . , a n (t + r n − 1)).
Denote by
. . , a n (t + r n − 1), . . . , a n (t)).
then the initial state of (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is
Proof. Denote byT,Ŝ : K r → K r (r = r 1 + . . . + r n ) the state transition maps of the systems (1),(3), respectively. By definition, we have that
Another useful notion is the following one. Definition 3.8. An explicit difference system (1) is called reducible if there is an integer 0 < m < n such that we have a subsystem
In other words, one has that
In this case, the state transition endomorphism and map of (4) are just the restrictions of the corresponding functions of (1) to the subring R r1,...,rm ⊂ R r1,...,rn and the subspace K r1+...+rm ⊂ K r1+...+rn , respectively.
One obtains immediately the following result.
Proposition 3.9. Let (1) be a reducible invertible system. Then, its subsystem (4) is also invertible. Moreover, the inverse system of (1) is also reducible with a subsystem which is the inverse system of (4).
Periodic systems
Definition 4.1. For an invertible system (1), consider the state transition map T : K r → K r (r = r 1 + . . . + r n ). We call the system periodic if there is an integer d > 0 such thatT d = id. In this case, the period of the mapT is called the period of the system (1).
Proposition 4.2. Consider a periodic system (1) with period d. If (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is a K-solution of (1), then all functions a i are periodic, that is, a i (t) = a i (t + d) for all clocks t ≥ 0.
Proof. If v ∈ K r is the initial state of (a 1 , . . . , a n ), by the argument of Theorem 2.3 we have that a 1 (t) is the first coordinate of the vectorT t (v) ∈ K r . SinceT t =T t+d , one has thatT t (v) =T t+d (v) and therefore a 1 (t) = a 1 (t + d). In a similar way, we also prove that a i (t) = a i (t + d) (1 < i ≤ n).
Note that if K = GF(q) is a finite field, the symmetric group S(K r ) has finite order and therefore all invertible systems are in fact periodic. We also observe that if K is an infinite field, then the state transition endomorphism T is bijective if and only if the state transition mapT is bijective. Moreover, we have that T is periodic if and only ifT is periodic and in this case these maps have the same period. Such facts are consequences of the following general result (see for instance [21, 23] ). Proposition 4.3. Consider a polynomial algebra P = K[x 1 , . . . , x r ] and an algebra endomorphism ϕ : P → P such that x 1 → g 1 , . . . , x r → g r (g i ∈ P ). Denote bŷ ϕ : K r → K r the corresponding polynomial map, that is, for any (α 1 , . . . , α r ) ∈ K r (α 1 , . . . , α r ) → (g 1 (α 1 , . . . , α r ), . . . , g r (α 1 , . . . , α r )).
The map ϕ →φ is an homomorphism from the monoid of the algebra endomorphism of P to the monoid of polynomial maps K r → K r . If K is an infinite field, such monoid homomorphism is bijective. Otherwise, if K = GF(q) then the map ϕ →φ induces a monoid isomorphism from the monoid of algebra endomorphisms of the quotient algebra P/L, where L = x q 1 − x 1 , . . . , x q r − x r ⊂ P . Note that P and P/L are the coordinate algebras of the affine space K r for the case that K is an infinite or finite field, respectively. An important and difficult task is to compute, or at least bound, the period of a periodic explicit difference system. As usual, the task becomes easy in the linear case.
are homogeneous linear ones. In other words, the state transition mapT :
Restating the Rational (or Frobenius) Canonical Form of a square matrix (see, for instance, [16] ) in terms of K-linear endomorphisms, one has the following result.
Proposition 4.5. Let ψ : K r → K r be any K-linear endomorphism. Then, there is a K-linear automorphism ξ :
is a K-linear endomorphism such that, for any (α 0 , . . . , α ri−1 ) ∈ K ri ψ ′ i (α 0 , . . . , α ri−2 , α ri−1 ) = (α 1 , . . . , α ri−1 , g i (α 0 , . . . , α ri−1 )) and g i is an homogeneous linear polynomial in r i variables. It follows that if ψ is an automorphism of finite period d, then d = lcm(d 1 , . . . , d n ) where d i is the period of ψ ′ i . Note that the above result provides that, up to an invertible K-linear change of variables, any linear difference system can be obtained in a canonical form, say (1), where f i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is a linear form which is defined only over the set of variables {x i (0), . . . , x i (r i − 1)}. In other words, the system is the join of linear difference equations on disjoint sets of variables. In cryptography (see, for instance, [25] ), a linear difference equation is called a Linear Feedback Shift Register or briefly LFSR.
For cryptographic applications, to have a periodic difference system with a large period d is a useful property. In the linear case, according to Proposition 4.5, to maximize d one needs that all d i are coprime so that d = d 1 · · · d n . Then, the problem reduces to maximize the period of each single periodic linear difference equation. This problem has a well-known solution when K = GF(p) = Z p with p a prime number. For the purpose of completeness, we provide such result.
Proposition 4.6. Consider an invertible linear difference equation
and assume that g is an irreducible polynomial. Consider the finite field F = GF(p r ) = Z p [t]/(g) and the corresponding multiplica-
, then the equation (5) has maximal period p r − 1.
Proof. The matrix corresponding to the state transition K-linear mapT : Z r p → Z r p of (5) with respect to the canonical basis of Z r p , is indeed the companion matrix A of the polynomial g, that is
Consider the algebra M r (Z p ) of all square matrices of order r with entries in the field Z p and denote by Z p [A] ⊂ M r (Z p ) the subalgebra that is generated by the matrix A. It is well-known that the minimal polynomial of the companion matrix A is exactly g and hence
Since α is a generator, that is, an element of maximal period in the cyclic group F * , we obtain that the period of α and A is exactly p r − 1.
Difference stream ciphers
From now on, let K = GF(q) be a finite field. It is important to note that in this case, by Lagrange interpolation, any function K r → K is in fact a polynomial one.
Moreover, if f ∈ K[x 1 , . . . , x r ] is the corresponding polynomial, we can assume that f is normal modulo the ideal L = x q 1 − x 1 , . . . , x q r − x r , that is, all exponents in the monomials of f are strictly less than q.
Definition 5.1. A difference stream cipher C is by definition an explict difference system (1) together with a polynomial f ∈ R r1,...,rn . If (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is a K-solution of (1), its initial state is called the key of (a 1 , . . . , a n ). Moreover, if v(t) ∈ K r (r = r 1 + . . . + r n ) is the t-state of (a 1 , . . . , a n ), the function b : N → K such that b(t) = f (v(t)) for all t ≥ 0, is called the keystream of (a 1 , . . . , a n ). Finally, we call f the keystream polynomial of the cipher C.
If (1) is linear, that is, a system of LFSRs, the polynomial f is required non-linear and it is usually called combining or filtering function. Since R r1,...,rn,0 = R r1,...,rn , observe that a difference stream cipher can also be defined as a special explicit difference system
x n (r n ) = f n , y(0) = f. In fact, by a K-solution (a 1 , . . . , a n , b) of such a system one obtains the keystream function b : N → K of the K-solution (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of (1).
In cryptography, a stream cipher (see, for instance, [17] ) operates simply by adding and subtracting the keystream to a stream of plaintexts or ciphertexts. Such a stream is by definition a function N → K. By a known plaintext attack we can assume the knowledge of the keystream as the difference between the known ciphertext and plaintext streams. Note that the keystream is usually provided by a stream cipher after a sufficiently high number of clocks in order to prevent cryptanalysis.
Definition 5.2. Let C be a difference stream cipher consisting of the system (1) and the keystream polynomial f . Let b : N → K be the keystream of a K-solution of (1) and fix a clock T ≥ 0. Consider the ideal
and denote by V K (J) the set of simultaneous K-solutions of all polynomials in J, or equivalently, of its generators. An algebraic attack to C by the keystream b after T clocks consists in computing the K-solutions (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of the system (1) such that (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ V K (J). In other words, if we consider the difference ideal corresponding to (1) , that is,
Since the given function b is the keystream of a K-solution of (1), say (a 1 , . . . , a n ), we have clearly that (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ V K (I + J) = ∅. For actual ciphers, we have generally that V K (I + J) = {(a 1 , . . . , a n )}.
Definition 5.3. With the notation of Definition 5.2, denote byV K (I + J) ⊂ K r the set of keys, that is, initial states of the K-solutions (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ V K (I + J). By Theorem 2.3, there is a bijective map V K (I + J) →V K (I + J) and we have that V K (I) = K r .
Theorem 5.4. Let T : R r1,...,rn → R r1,...,rn be the state transition endomorphism of the system (1) and put f ′ t = T t (f ) ∈ R r1,...,rn , for all t ≥ 0. Moreover, define the ideal
Then, we have thatV K (I + J) = V K (J ′ ).
Proof. Let (a 1 , . . . , a n ) be a K-solution of (1) and denote by v(t) its t-state (t ≥ 0). By the identity (2), one obtains that
. , x n (r n ) − f n } is a difference Gröbner basis of the difference ideal I = G σ , by Theorem 2.12 one obtains that
. In actual algebraic attacks, we are given a finite number of values of the keystream b, that is, for a fixed integer bound B ≥ T , we consider the finitely generated ideal
We have clearly that
Since the polynomial algebra R r1,...,rn is finitely generated and hence Noetherian, one has that J ′ B = J ′ for some B ≥ T . In other words, we don't lose any equation satisfied by the keys if a sufficiently large number of keystream values is provided for the attack.
To compute the set V K (J ′ B ) ⊂ K r one can use essentially Gröbner bases or SAT solvers when K = GF(2) (see, for instance, [2] ). For practical ciphers, one has generally that V K (J ′ B ) = V K (J ′ ) contains a single K-solution, that is, a single key. By the Shape Lemma (see, for instance, [18] ) one obtains the following result for K = GF(q).
Proposition 5.5. Consider the polynomial algebra P = K[x 1 , . . . , x r ] and the ideal L = x q 1 −x 1 , . . . , x q r −x r ⊂ P . Moreover, let J ⊂ P be any ideal and denote by V (J) the set ofK-solutions of all polynomials f ∈ J where the fieldK is the algebraic closure of K. We have that V (L) = K r and V K (J) = V (J) ∩ K r = V (J + L) where J + L ⊂ P is a radical ideal. Moreover, if V K (J) = {(α 1 , . . . , α n )} then G = {x 1 − α 1 , . . . , x n − α n } is the (reduced) universal Gröbner basis of J + L, that is, its Gröbner basis with respect to all monomial orderings of P .
The above result is very useful for algebraic attacks because Gröbner bases computations are very sensitive on the monomial orderings and we are free here to choose the most efficient orderings as DegRevLex. Another possible optimization when performing the Buchberger algorithm on the ideal J + L ⊂ P consists in skipping all remaining S-polynomials once each variable x i (1 ≤ i ≤ r) has been obtained as the leading monomial of an element in the current Gröbner basis. In some cases, this trick speeds up the computation in a significant way.
Let C be a difference stream cipher which is given by the system (1) and the keystream polynomial f . The polynomial f ′ t = T t (f ) ∈ R r1,...,rn has generally an high degree if T is large with respect to 0. This is usually the case in actual ciphers where an high number of clocks is required before the keystream appears. Nevertheless, if the system (1) is invertible we can always assume that T = 0. In fact, by means of the notion of inverse system in Definition 3.6, to compute the T -state is completely equivalent to compute the initial state, that is, the key of a K-solution of (1). This is a very effective optimization because it reduces drastically the degrees of the generators of the ideal J ′
. Recall in fact that we have to compute a Gröbner basis for obtaining K-solutions and such computations are very sensitive on the degree of the generators. We apply this strategy when attacking the stream cipher Bivium in Section 6. If the polynomials f ′ t have still high degrees and they are even difficult to compute, an alternative strategy consists in computing directly the K-solutions of the system (1) which are also solutions of the fixed degree polynomials σ t (f ) − b(T + t) (0 ≤ t ≤ B − T ). Even though the clocks of the variables in X can be bounded, this strategy has the main drawback that one has to compute a Gröbner basis over a generally high number of variables.
We have just observed that difference stream ciphers that are defined by invertible systems show some lack of security with respect to algebraic attacks. On the other hand, invertible systems can be used to define block ciphers.
Definition 5.6. A difference block cipher C is by definition a reducible invertible system (1) together with an integer T ≥ 0. If (4) is the subsystem of (1), we put k = r 1 + . . . + r m and l = r m+1 + . . . + r n . If a t-state of a K-solution (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of (1) is denoted as the pair (u(t), v(t)) ∈ K k × K l = K r , we call u(0) the key, v(0) the plaintext and v(T ) the ciphertext of (a 1 , . . . , a n ). Moreover, we call (u(T ), v(T )) the final state of (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and (4) the key subsystem of the cipher C.
With the language of cryptography, the encryption function E u(0) : K l → K l of the difference block cipher C is given by the map v(0) → v(T ), where the pair (u(0), v(0)) varies in the affine space K k × K l of all initial states of the K-solutions of (1). To provide the decryption function we introduce the following notion.
Definition 5.7. Let C be a difference block cipher consisting of a reducible invertible system (1) and a clock T ≥ 0. The inverse cipher of C is by definition the inverse system of (1) together with T .
Let C ′ be the inverse cipher of C where (3) is the inverse system of (1). Consider also the key subsystem (4) of C. If u(0) is the key of a solution of (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of (1), we can compute u(T ) by means of (4) without knowing v(0). If we are given the ciphertext v(T ), we have hence the final state (u(T ), v(T )) of (a 1 , . . . , a n ). By Proposition 3.7, the inverse system (3) provides the computation of the initial state (u(0), v(0)) of (a 1 , . . . , a n ) and in particular of the plaintext v(0). In other words, the decription function D u(0) : K l → K l is obtained as the map v(T ) → v(0) which is computable by means of the systems (3), (4).
Definition 5.8. Let C be a difference block cipher given by a reducible invertible system (1) and a clock T ≥ 0. For all t ≥ 0, let (u(t), v(t)) ∈ K k × K l be the t-state of a K-solution of (1) where we denote v(t) = (a m+1 (t), . . . , a m+1 (t + r m+1 − 1), . . . , a n (t), . . . , a n (t + r n − 1)).
Consider the corresponding linear ideal
and put J = J(0) + J(T ). An algebraic attack to C by the plaintext-ciphertext pair (v(0), v(T )) consists in computing the K-solutions (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of the system (1) such that (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ V K (J).
Note that the above attack belongs to the class of known plaintext attacks. Since the given pair (v(0), v(T )) is obtained by the states (u(t), v(t)) of a K-solution of (1), say (a 1 , . . . , a n ), we have clearly that (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ V K (I + J) = ∅. For actual ciphers, one has generally that the set V K (I + J) contains more than one K-solution. Since computing a unique solution by a Gröbner basis is faster than computing multiple solutions because one uses efficient monomial orderings, we can obtain uniqueness by attacking with multiple plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Precisely, fix an integer s > 1 and let (u(t), v (i) (t)) (1 ≤ i ≤ s) be the t-state of a K-solution (a 1 , . . . , a m , a (i) m+1 , . . . , a (i) n ) of the system (1) where (a 1 , . . . , a m ) is some fixed K-solution of the key subsystem (4) . In other words, we consider some plaintext-ciphertext pairs (v (i) (0), v (i) (T )) (1 ≤ i ≤ s) which are obtained by a same key u(0). To describe properly a multiple pairs attack, we also need the following notations.
For each i = 1, 2, . . . , s and t ≥ 0, consider the set of variables
Clearly, the polynomial algebra R (i) is isomorphic to R and we denote by I (i) ⊂ R (i) the ideal which is isomorphic to I ⊂ R. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ s, consider (1) as written in the variables X (i) and let J (i) (t) ⊂ R (i) (t ≥ 0) be the linear ideal corresponding to the t-state of the K-solution (a 1 , . . . , a m , a (i) m+1 , . . . , a (i) n ) of the system (1) . Moreover, we put X ′ = i X (i) , R ′ = K[X ′ ] and we denote by I ′ , J ′ (t) the ideals of R ′ that are generated by i I (i) , i J (i) (t), respectively. Finally, we put J ′ = J ′ (0) + J ′ (T ). Definition 5.9. Let C be a difference block cipher given by a reducible invertible system (1) and a clock T ≥ 0. An algebraic attack to C by the multiple plaintextciphertext pairs (v (i) (0), v (i) (T )) (1 ≤ i ≤ s) consists in computing the K-solutions (a 1 , . . . , a m , a (1) m+1 , . . . , a (s) m+1 , . . . , a (1) n , . . . , a (s) n ) ∈ V K (I ′ + J ′ ). For practical ciphers, a sufficiently large number of pairs implies that we have V K (I ′ + J ′ ) = {(a 1 , . . . , a m , a (1) m+1 , . . . , a (s) m+1 , . . . , a (1) n , . . . , a (s) n )}. By bounding the clocks of the variables in X ′ , one can compute this unique K-solution and hence its key u(0) = (a 1 (0), . . . , a 1 (r 1 − 1), . . . , a m (0), . . . , a m (r m − 1)) using a Gröbner basis computation as in Proposition 5.5. Alternatively, for K = GF(2) one can use SAT solvers or other methods. In Section 7 we make use of multiple pairs when attacking the block cipher KeeLoq.
Since the final clock T is usually chosen a large one, the main drawback of this approach is the high number of variables. Nevertheless, such strategy is generally the only feasible one. In fact, the normal forms of the generators of J ′ (T ) modulo I ′ + J ′ (0) belong to R r1,...,rm but they may have very high degrees because of the large clock T . As for stream ciphers, the main problem is hence to reduce somehow the final clock T . Even though the system (1) of the block cipher C is invertible, note that we cannot attack an internal state instead of the initial one because the set V K (I ′ + J ′ (t)) (t ≤ T ) generally contains too many solutions. In other words, a ciphertext only attack is generally too weak for difference block ciphers. Some better strategy is possible when the period of the key subsystem (4), say d, is sufficiently small. This technique has been introduced in [5] to attack KeeLoq.
To simplify its description, let us assume that the final state T is a multiple of d. Consider the state transition mapT : K r → K r of the explicit difference system (1) and denote byŜ : K k → K k the state transition map of the subsystem (4). Recall thatŜ is just the restriction of the mapT to the subspace K k ⊂ K r (k = r 1 + . . . + r m , r = r 1 + . . . + r n ). By definition of period, one has thatŜ d = id and thereforê S d (u) = u, for all u ∈ K k . For any t ≥ 0, denote by (u(t), v(t)) ∈ K k × K l = K r the t-state of a K-solution (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of the system (1) . Then, the encryption function E u(0) : K l → K l corresponding to the key u(0) ∈ K k is the map v(0) → v(T ). By a chosen plaintext attack, we can assume the knowledge of the bijection E u(0) . If K l is a reasonably large space, one has a good chance (see [5] ) that E u(0) has fixed points v(0) = v(T ) which are also computable. Observe now that v(0) = v(d) implies that v(0) = v(T ). In fact, by definition (u(d), v(d)) =T d (u(0), v(0)) and we have that u(d) =Ŝ d (u(0)) = u(0). Then, from v(0) = v(d) it follows that (u(0), v(0)) =T d (u(0), v(0)) and hence (u(0), v(0)) =T T (u(0), v(0)) because T is a multiple of d. We conclude that among the fixed points of the encryption function E u(0) one has the fixed points of the map v(0) 0)) is a plaintext-ciphertext pair for the final clocks d and T . In other words, by means of such pairs we can perform an algebraic attack to the difference block cipher C assuming that the final clock is just the period of the key subsystem.
Let us conclude this section with a final general observation. When we apply Proposition 5.5 for solving algebraic systems, an essential trick consists in adding some linear polynomials to the considered ideal J + L ⊂ K[x 1 , . . . , x r ] (L = x q 1 − x 1 , . . . , x q r − x r ) in order to speed up the Gröbner basis computation. Such linear polynomials are either elements of J which are given or computed ones, or they correspond to the evaluations of some subset of variables {x i1 , . . . , x is } ⊂ {x 1 , . . . , x r }. If some of these evaluations, say x i k = α i k (α i k ∈ K), is wrong and V K (J) contains a unique solution, one has that
and the Gröbner basis computation stops as soon as the element 1 is obtained. Note that using instead a SAT solver, the answer "UNSAT" essentially arrives when the full space K r (K = GF(2)) has been examinated. This means that for wrong evaluations, which are all except that one, Gröbner basis solving is generally faster than SAT solving. We have evidence of this in practice in Section 6.
Note that solving after the evaluation of some bunch of variables is usually called a guess-and-determine strategy. Its total complexity is the product a · q s where a is the average solving time for a single guess and q s is the number of guesses for K = GF(q). We can assume average total complexity as 1/2 · a · q s . Then, the optimization of the choice of the variables to be guessed is a very important issue for polynomial system solving and algebraic attacks. The parallelization of the computation for different guesses is also a viable way to reduce total computing time.
Attacking Bivium
We start with an important example of difference stream cipher which is called Trivium. This cipher was designed in 2003 by De Cannière and Preneel as a submission to European project eSTREAM [6] . In fact, Trivium was one of the winners of the project for the category of hardware-oriented ciphers. Even though it has been widely cryptanalysed, no critical attacks are known up to date. The system of explicit difference equations describing Trivium looks quite simple since it consists only of three quadratic equations over the base field K = GF(2), namely Therefore, a t-state consists of 288 = 93 + 84 + 111 bits, for any clock t ≥ 0. The keystream bits are known by the attackers starting with clock T = 4 · 288 = 1152.
The key and the initial vector of Trivium are 80 bit vectors and they form together 160 bits of an initial state. The remaining 128 bits are fixed ones.
By Corollary 3.4, we obtain that the system (6) is invertible with inverse system This allows an algebraic attack to the T -state instead of the initial state containing the key and the initial vector. Indeed, such an attack shows to have complexity which is greater than key recovery (80 bit) by exaustive search (see, for instance, [14] ). For this reason, we present instead all optimizations and computational data that we have obtained for a well-studied simplified version of Trivium cipher which is called Bivium. The explicit difference system defining Bivium are the following two quadratic equations (7) x ( In this case, the t-states are vectors of 93 + 84 = 177 bits and the keystream starts at clock T = 4 · 177 = 708. Again, the key and the initial vector are 80 + 80 = 160 bits of the initial state. Corollary 3.4 implies that the system (7) (7) is invertible, we can attack the T -state by the ideal
We 
Because the clocks of the variables in f are all multiple of 3, we can divide these polynomials into 3 sets of 22 linear polynomials, namely
By performing Gaussian elimination over S i , we obtain 22 pivot variables and 36 free variables. In other words, for any set S i the evaluation of 36 variables implies the evaluation of 36 + 22 = 58 variables. This is a good trick that was first observed in [22] . In our computations, we choose the set S 2 , that is, we guess the following 36 free variables We propose now tables where we compare the solving time to obtain the set V K (J ′′ B + E α1,...,α38 ) by using Gröbner bases and SAT solvers. For Gröbner bases, we make use of two main implementations of the Buchberger algorithm that are available in the computer algebra system Singular [7] , namely std and slimgb. The considered SAT solvers are minisat [11] and cryptominisat [24] which are widely used in cryptanalysis.
We have carried out the computations on a server: Intel(R) Core(TM) i7 − 8700 CPU @ 3.20GHz, 6 Cores, 12 Threads, 32 GB RAM with a Debian based Linux operating system. In our tables, we abbreviate milliseconds and seconds by ms and s, respectively. In both tables, the rows correspond to different choices of the number of keystream bits that are used for the attack. The second and third column present the 90% confidence intervals for Gröbner bases timings that are obtained by slimgb and std. The fourth and fifth column contain the intervals for SAT solvers timings corresponding to minisat and cryptominisat.
In Table 1 , the confidence intervals for Gröbner bases are computed for 2 4 different random (key, iv)-pairs and 2 10 different random guesses of the 38 variables in (8) for each (key, iv)-pair. In other words, the confidence intervals contain 90% of the timings that are obtained by a total of 2 14 computations. The intervals for SAT solvers are computed for the same set of 2 4 (key, iv)-pairs and with a subset of 2 4 different random guesses from the set that we have considered for Gröbner bases. The motivation of such reduction are larger total computing times for SAT solving.
Similarly, in Table 2 the confidence intervals are computed for the same 2 4 (key, iv)-pairs of Table 1 and the correct guess of the 38 variables corresponding to each (key, iv)-pair.
For Bivium attack, the tables show that the procedure slimgb is faster than std. This happens because "slim", that is, compact elements in the resulting Gröbner bases imply faster S-polynomial reductions which are the most expensive component of these computations. Moreover, we have that Gröbner bases perform better than SAT solvers for computing solutions of the algebraic systems involved in the Bivium attack. This is especially true for the UNSAT case which is dominant for computing total complexity. About 190 keystream bits are the best choice for the attack and we conclude that its average total complexity for a sequential computation is 1/2 · 0.12 · 2 38 s ∼ 2 34 s.
Attacking KeeLoq
In this section we consider a difference block cipher which is named KeeLoq. This cipher has important applications in remote keyless entry systems which are used, for instance, by automotive industry. KeeLoq is a proprietary cipher [3] whose cryptographic algorithm was created by Gideon Kuhn at the University of Pretoria in the mid-1980s. Starting from the mid-1990s, the cipher was widely used by car manufactures but it has begun to be cryptanalysed only in 2007. In particular, we mention the paper [5] where there are algebraic attacks to KeeLoq that have inspired this section. For another important class of "meet-in-the-middle attacks", see [15] .
The block cipher KeeLoq is defined by a reducible invertible difference system over the base field K = GF(2), where the key subsystem consists of a single homogeneous linear equation (LFSR). In fact, its state transition K-linear map corresponds to a cyclic permutation matrix of period 64. In addition to the key equation, the invertible system consists of an explicit difference cubic equation involving a single key variable. Precisely, the KeeLoq system is the following one
The key, that is, the initial state of the key equation, consists therefore of 64 bits and the plaintext and ciphertext are 32 bits vectors. In other words, any t-state of KeeLoq consists of 64 + 32 = 96 bits. The final clock of this difference block cipher is defined as the clock T = 8 · 64 + 16 = 528. By Theorem 3.2, we compute the inverse of (9) as the following system To describe a multiple plaintext-ciphertext pairs attack to KeeLoq, consider two such pairs We define the difference ideal I ′ = G ′ σ ⊂ R ′ and the linear ideal
. . , y(T + 31) + β ′′ 31 . An algebraic attack to KeeLoq by the plaintext-ciphertext pairs (v ′ , v ′′ ) and (w ′ , w ′′ ) consists in computing V K (I ′ + J ′ ). Note that we can indeed assume that the variables clocks are bounded by T + 31, that is, we solve over the finite set of variables 0≤t≤T +31 {k(t), x(t), y(t)}. Actually, the computation of V K (I ′ + J ′ ) is unfeasible for T = 528. If we would assume that T = 512 = 8 · 64, we could use the trick of fixed pairs which is described at the end of Section 5. Briefly, if (u(t), v(t)) ∈ K 64 × K 32 denotes the t-state of the system (9), the trick consists in computing enough fixed points v(0) = v(512) by the knowledge of the encryption function and to assume that some of them are in fact fixed points v(0) = v(64). By means of a couple of such plaintext-ciphertext pairs (v(0), v(0)), we are reduced to compute V K (I ′ + J ′ ) for T = 64.
The problem now is how to compute v(512) from the ciphertext v(528). If we would assume that the variables k(0), . . . , k(15) are evaluated by the correct corresponding key bits, we could apply the inverse cipher (10) since these bits are the only ones which are involved in the computation of v(512) from v(528). We don't know in fact such correct evaluation and hence we need to try all 2 16 values of the variables k(0), . . . , k (15) . On the other hand, milliseconds are enough to compute each set V K (I ′ + J ′ + E α0,...,α15 ) where T = 64, (α 1 , . . . , α 15 ) ∈ K 16 and E α0,...,α15 = k(0) + α 0 , . . . , k(15) + α 15 .
As usual, such solving can be provided by Gröbner bases or SAT solvers.
We conclude that the total complexity of this algebraic attack to KeeLoq can be described by the formula (a · b · 2 32 + c) · 2 16 where a is the average percentage of the plaintext space K 32 containing enough fixed points v(0) = v(512), b is the average encryption and decryption time for 528 + 16 clocks and c is the average total computing time for obtaining the sets V K (I ′ + J ′ + E α0,...,α15 ) for each couple of such fixed points. The authors of [5] suggest that there are 26% of keys such that a = 60%. Among the computed fixed points v(0) = v(512), they also assume a good chance that at least one couple v ′ (0), v ′′ (0) of them is such that v ′ (0) = v ′ (64), v ′′ (0) = v ′′ (64). In our experiments we make use of 4 distinct random such "weak keys".
In the following tables we present statistics of the values b, c. Similarly to Section 6, the solving time c is provided for Gröbner basis algorithms and SAT solvers and it appears in the columns corresponding to slimgb, std, minisat, cryptominisat. Recall that c is the total computing time for solving the algebraic systems corresponding to all couples that are obtained by computed fixed points v(0) = v(512). In Table 3 , we present 90% confidence intervals corresponding to 4 weak keys and 4 distinct random guesses of the variables k(0), . . . , k(15) for each key. The reason of such small number is that the total encryption-decryption time a · b · 2 32 when a = 0.6 is about 2.5 hours by an executable C file. The confidence interval of b, that is, the timing for a single encryption-decryption is obtained by the corresponding interval of this total time.
In Table 4 the confidence intervals are computed for the same 4 weak keys and the correct guess of the 16 variables corresponding to each key.
In both tables, we observe that the value of b is almost uniform and this happens because for each key the computations differ only in the last 16 decryption clocks. For the algebraic systems involved in the KeeLoq attack, the SAT solvers seem to be the best option. Nevertheless, note that in the tables of Section 6 and 7, the time for computing ANF-to-CNF conversion (see, for instance, [2] ) is not considered. In particular, for KeeLoq attack this would imply that Gröbner bases (std method) and SAT solvers have comparable timings. In any case, for considered guesses of the variables k(0), . . . , k (15) , this solving time c shows to be very small with respect to d = a · b · 2 32 which is total search time for enough fixed points. In other words, the total complexity of the attack is practically d · 2 16 or it is half of this time in the average case.
Conclusions and further directions
In this paper we have shown that the notion of system of explicit difference equations over a finite field is a useful tool to define and study a large class of stream and block ciphers. Secure ciphers belong to such class, as, for instance, Trivium. The algebraic properties of difference ciphers imply algebraic attacks that can be used to establish the security degree of a specific cipher given by some set of equations. As a further development of the theory of difference ciphers we suggest to study how to compute and maximize their period in the non-linear case. Finally, other classes of ciphers can be introduced for more general state transition endomorphisms.
